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  This	  is	  a	  discussion	  note	  rather	  than	  a	  polished	  paper.	  I	  have	  kept	  references	  down	  to	  a	  minimum.	  It	  is	  written	  with	  the	  intent	  of	  setting	  out	  some	  of	  the	  basic	  issues	  and	  is	  meant	  to	   stimulate	   debate	   and	   discussion	   around	   the	   political	   issues	   of	   industrial	   policy.	   It	  draws	   heavily	   on	   my	   personal	   experience	   in	   formulating	   and	   implementing	   industrial	  strategies	   in	   South	   Africa	   in	   two	   areas:	   a)	   at	   a	   regional	   level	   with	   the	   Western	   Cape	  government	   and	  b)	   and	   at	   a	  national	   level	   through	   attempting	   to	   organise	   firms	   in	   the	  various	  components	  of	  the	  clothing	  and	  textile	  value	  chain	  and	  negotiate	  a	  sector	  policy	  on	  their	  behalf	  with	  national	  government.	  	  	  
DRAFT	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   2	  
SETTING	  THE	  CONCEPTUAL	  SCENE	  
Some	  of	  the	  issues	  to	  consider	  In	   this	   note	   on	   stimulating	   a	   discussion	   around	   building	   state	   capacity,	   I	   try	   to	   raise	   a	  number	   of	   questions/issues	   derived	   from	  my	   own	   experiences	   around	   both	   industrial	  policy	  and	  the	  politics	  of	  growth	  that	   impact	  on	  the	  ability	  to	  translate	   industrial	  policy	  into	  implementable	  strategy.	  This	  is	  a	  discussion	  which	  pivots	  around	  the	  alignments	  and	  conflicts	  of	  interests	  within	  the	  state,	  as	  well	  as	  between	  state,	  private	  sector,	  and	  unions.	  	  The	   politics	   of	   growth	   is	   wider	   than	   the	   issue	   of	   how	   industrial	   policy	   is	   designed.	  However	  we	  often	  engage	  in	  the	  discussion	  as	  if	  it	  was	  simply	  a	  question	  of	  policy,	  leaving	  out	  a	  crucial	  political	  component	  of	  the	  equation	  –	  i.e.	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  politics	  plays	  itself	  out	  within	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  formulation	  of	  policy	  and	  its	  translation	  into	  strategy.	  Let	  me	  start	  by	  asserting	  four	  key	  questions	  at	  issue	  in	  discussion	  of	  industrial	  policy:	  
o Can	  industrial	  policy	  lead	  to	  economic	  growth?	  This	  most	  often	  turns	  on	  the	  state	  versus	  market	  debate.	  
o Can	   one	   attain	   economic	   growth	   through	   big	   jumps	   or	   does	   one	  make	   do	   with	  what	   one’s	   existent	   capacities.	   This	   is	   essentially	   a	   debate	   around	   creating	  competitive	   advantage	   or	   operating	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   ones	   existing	   comparative	  advantage.	  	  
o How	   can	   capacity	   in	   government	   be	   built	   such	   that	   it	   is	   able	   to	   formulate	   and	  particularly	   implement	  policies	  more	   effectively?	  This	   is	   essentially	   a	   discussion	  around	  the	  role	  and	  limits	  of	  upgrading	  and	  skill	  building?	  In	  other	  words	  the	  role	  of	  learning	  and	  adapting	  as	  opposed	  to	  an	  all	  knowing	  state.	  
o Who	  leads	  the	  process?	  This	  is	  a	  discussion	  around	  the	  politics	  of	  growth	  and	  the	  role	  of	  government	  and/or	  business.	  I	   start	   from	   the	   premise	   that	   industrial	   policy	   has	   to	   tackle	   the	   problem	   through	   the	  following	  three	  framing	  issues:	  
o Direct	  versus	   indirect	  policy	  and	  strategy	  –	  some	  state	   interventions	  are	  directly	  designed	   as	   industrial	   policy	  whilst	   others	   are	   not	   intended	   as	   industrial	   policy	  but	  have	  an	  important	  indirect	  impact	  on	  industry.	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o There	   are	   different	   levels	   of	   state	   and	   economic	   activity	   –	   i.e.	  macro,	  meso,	   and	  micro	  interventions	  
o Policy	  coherence	  versus	  policy	  (i.e.	  political)	  will.	  	  Although	  this	  discussion	  note	  deals	  more	  or	  less	  with	  all	  of	  these	  areas,	  the	  major	  point	  in	  the	  note	   is	   to	  outline	   the	  centrality	  of	  policy	  coherence	  and	  political	  will	  and	  stress	   the	  key	  differences	  between	  them.	  In	  other	  words	  bringing	  politics	  back	  into	  the	  discussion	  of	  industrial	  policy	  
The	  dominance	  of	  two	  conventional	  orthodoxies	  	  Industrial	  policy	  has	  critically	  been	  polarised	  into	  those	  who	  favour	  the	  market	  over	  the	  state	   (free	   market	   advocates),	   and	   those	   who	   argue	   for	   major	   state	   intervention	   to	  overcome	   market	   failure	   (developmental	   state	   advocates).	   The	   former	   are	   classically	  represented	  by	  the	  World	  Bank/IMF	  through	  the	  Washington	  Consensus,	  whilst	  Ha-­‐Joon	  Chang	  has	  been	  the	  most	  vociferous	  advocate	  of	  the	  latter	  position.	  	  Those	   sympathetic	   to	   the	   Washington	   consensus	   (World	   Bank	   1997)	   argue	   for	   the	  primacy	  of	  the	  market	  and	  are	  sceptical	  of	  government	  intervention	  aimed	  at	  shaping	  the	  pattern	  of	  industrialisation.	  They	  argue	  that	  the	  biggest	  single	  challenge	  for	  government	  in	  its	  development	  of	  policies	  for	  different	  economic	  sectors	  and	  cross-­‐cutting	  themes	  is	  one	  of	   limited	   information.	   In	  order	   to	   identify	  appropriate	  policies,	  government	  has	   to	  identify	   the	  myriad	   of	   opportunities	   and	   constraints	   that	   firms	   face	   and	   to	   understand	  firm	   responses.	   As	   the	   World	   Bank	   report	   (1993)	   into	   the	   determinants	   of	   industrial	  success	   in	   eight	   “highly	   performing	   Asian	   economies”	   (Hong	   Kong,	   Indonesia,	   Japan,	  Korea,	  Malaysia,	  Singapore,	  Taiwan	  and	  Thailand)	  concluded	  this	  is	  obviously	  a	  daunting	  task,	   and	   beyond	   the	   scope	   of	   most	   developing	   country	   administrations.	   “The	  prerequisites	   for	   success	  were	   so	   rigorous	   that	   policymakers	   seeking	   to	   follow	   similar	  paths	  in	  other	  developing	  countries	  have	  often	  met	  with	  failure”	  (World	  Bank	  1993:	  6).	  	  It	   concluded,	   in	   summary,	   that	   the	   only	   positive	   role	   which	   these	   governments	   had	  played	   was	   to	   promote	   generic	   economy-­‐wide	   incentives	   (e.g.	   education	   and	   research	  and	  development)	   to	  compensate	   for	  market	   failures.	  The	  Report	  explicitly	  argued	   that	  targeted	   industrial	   policies	   had	   been	   a	   failure,	   even	   though	   it	   acknowledged	   that	  providing	   unambiguous	   “proof”	   was	   difficult.	   There	   were	   two	   central	   conclusions	   that	  arose	   from	   this	   study:	   Firstly,	   it	  was	   argued	   that	   targeted	   industrial	   policies	   cannot	   be	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shown	  to	  have	  had	  a	  net	  positive	  impact	  on	  industrial	  performance;	  and	  secondly,	  even	  if	  it	  were	   true	   that	   targeted	  policies	  might	  be	  effective	   in	   some	  environments,	   the	  call	  on	  administrative	  expertise	  was	  so	  significant	  that	  few	  developing	  economies	  could	  hope	  to	  benefit	  from	  their	  use.	  	  For	   this	   reason	  many	  orthodox	   economists	   stress	   the	   enormity	   of	   the	   task	   confronting	  government	  while	  simultaneously	  emphasising	  the	  limitations	  on	  government	  capacities	  and	   resources.	   For	   them,	   the	   probability	   that	   such	  policy	   interventions	  will	   fail	   is	   very	  high.	   Indeed,	   government	   failure	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   ubiquitous1.	   Consequently	   they	   argue	  against	  the	  need	  for	  state	  governed	  interventions,	  instead	  asserting	  the	  pre-­‐eminence	  of	  the	  market	  over	  the	  state	  as	  the	  appropriate	  mechanism	  to	  resolve	  problems	  and	  ensure	  economic	  growth.	  Hence	  they	  privilege	  trade	  policy	   liberalisation,	  deregulation,	  Foreign	  Direct	   Investment	   (FDI)	   and	   the	   dismantling	   of	   policy	   and	   administrative	   regimes	  designed	  to	  promote	  industrial	  development.	  In	  this	  perspective,	  there	  is	  seemingly	  no	  politics	  of	  growth	  because	  the	  concept	  of	  state	  intervention	  is	  frowned	  on.	  The	  underlying	  concept	  is	  one	  of	  static	  allocative	  efficiency	  so	  upgrading	   is	   not	   an	   issue,	   and	   capacity	   building	   in	   government	   becomes	   downplayed.	  Comparative	  advantage	  rules	  because	  fundamentally	  the	  market	  knows	  best.	  	  	  	  This	   view	   of	   eschewing	   state	   intervention	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   market	   has	   come	   to	   be	  accepted	   as	   the	   dominant	   orthodoxy	   in	   economics,	   and	   hence	   in	   the	   minds	   of	  conventional	   economists,	   industrial	   policies	  have	  been	   considered	   to	  be	   jettisoned	   into	  history’s	  trash	  bin.	  However	  as	  Rodrik	  (2007)	  points	  out:	  	  
The	  reality	  is	  that	   industrial	  policies	  have	  run	  rampant	  during	  the	  last	  two	  decades	   	   -­‐	  and	  nowhere	  more	  than	  in	  those	  steadfastly	  adopted	  the	  agenda	  of	  orthodox	  reform.	  If	  this	  fact	  has	   escaped	   attention,	   it	   is	   only	   because	   the	   preferential	   policies	   in	   question	   have	  privileged	  exports	  and	  investment	  -­‐	  the	  two	  fetishes	  of	  the	  Washington	  Consensus	  era	  –	  and	  because	   their	   advocates	   have	   called	   them	   strategies	   of	   “outward	   orientation”	   and	   other	  similar	   sounding	   names	   instead	   of	   industrial	   policies.	   Anytime	   a	   government	   consciously	  favours	  some	  economic	  activities	  over	  others,	  it	  is	  conducting	  industrial	  policy.	  And	  by	  this	  standard	  the	  recent	  past	  has	  seen	  more	  than	  its	  share	  of	  industrial	  policies.	  (pg.	  119)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Pack	  and	  Saggi	  (2006)	  argue	  that	   the	  “range	  and	  depth	  of	  knowledge	  that	  policy	  makers	  would	  have	  to	  master	   to	   implement	   a	   successful	   industrial	   policy	   is	   extraordinary.	   They	  would	   have	   to	   understand	   the	  relevance	  of	  ,	  and	  be	  accurately	  informed	  about,	  a	  huge	  range	  of	  complex	  questions	  and	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  accurately	  evaluate	  very	  subtle	  differences”	  (pg	  21).	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The	  issue	  therefore	  in	  reality	  becomes	  not	  one	  of	  whether	  to	  engage	  in	  industrial	  policy,	  but	  rather	  how,	  in	  what	  form,	  and	  under	  whose	  direction,	  one	  should	  do	  so.	  	  A	   vocal	   proponent	   of	  what	  we	  may	   term	   ‘orthodox	   industrial	   policy’	   is	   Ha-­‐Joon	   Chang	  work	   (1996,	   1998,	   2002).	   His	   definition	   of	   industrial	   policy	   is	   narrow,	   identifying	  selective	  policies	  to	  target	  particular	  sectors	  and	  firms,	  regarded	  as	  “national	  champions”.	  Thus,	   he	   cautions	   against	   a	   wide	   perspective	   which	   comprise	   a	   ‘catch-­‐all	   term	   for	   all	  policies	  affecting	  industrial	  performance’.	  Instead	  he	  defines	  ‘industrial	  policy	  as	  a	  policy	  aimed	  at	  particular	   industries	   (and	   firms	  as	   their	  components)	   to	  achieve	   the	  outcomes	  that	  are	  perceived	  by	  the	  state	  to	  be	  efficient	  for	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  whole	  (emphasis	  in	  the	  original)	  (Chang,	  1994	  :59-­‐60).	  	  In	   this	   framework	   industrial	   policy	   is	   targeted	   at	   protecting	   and	   facilitating	   particular	  sectors,	  utilising	  efficient	   far	   sighted	  state	   institutions,	   to	   ‘defy	  a	  countries	  comparative	  advantage’	  and	  create	  competitive	  advantages2.	  	  This	  all	  takes	  place	  at	  the	  national	  level.	  Consequently	  one	  struggles	  to	  find	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  the	  role	  of	  industrial	  policy	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  firm,	  region,	  cluster,	  or	  value	  chain	  in	  this	  work.	  	  A	  key	  problem	  for	  this	  conceptualisation	  of	  industrial	  policy	  however	  lies	  in	  the	  issue	  of	  state	  capacity	  -­‐	  who	  knows	  and	  who	  decides?	  Empirically	  the	  favoured	  example	  brought	  to	  bear	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  success	  of	  this	  model	  is	  the	  role	  played	  by	  the	  state	  in	  South	  Korea	   (or	   sometimes	   the	   other	   NICS	   are	   also	   cited).	   But	   this	   begs	   the	   question	   of	   its	  applicability	   to	  most	  developing	  countries	  whether	   they	  be	   low	  or	  even	  middle	   income	  ones,	  where:	  
o the	  state’s	  institutional	  capacity	  is	  low	  and	  disorganised,	  	  
o human	  resource	  capability	  is	  poor,	  	  
o corruption	  is	  often	  endemic	  and	  targeting	  industries	  facilitates	  political	  capture,	  	  
o even	   if	   government	   could	   pick	   winners	   developing	   countries	   government	  bureaucracies	  are	  generally	  incompetent,	  	  
o officials	  have	  little	  experience	  of	  industry	  and	  its	  needs,	  and	  	  
o hence	   are	   incapable	   of	   leading,	   and	   the	   major	   problem	   lies	   in	   implementing	  industrial	  policy	  no	  matter	  how	  sophisticated	  its	  formulation	  might	  be.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  A	  phrase	  used	  in	  his	  debate	  with	  Justin	  Lin	  in	  Development	  Policy	  Review,	  2009,	  27	  (5):	  483-­‐502	  
	   6	  
The	  problem	  with	  the	  orthodox	  industrial	  policy	  advocates,	  is	  that	  the	  stress	  on	  targeted	  interventions	   implicitly	  assumes	  that	   the	  state	   ‘knows’	  or	  has	  access	   to	  pre-­‐determined	  ‘knowledge’	  with	  respect	  to	  what	  to	  target,	  both	  generally	  as	  well	  as	  within	  the	  selected	  sector.	  In	  other	  words	  the	  issue	  of	  government	  ‘learning’	  is	  relegated	  from	  the	  discourse.	  Knowledge	   is	   rather	   a	   result	   of	   sound	   information	   provided	   by	   research	   institutions	  within	   government	   or	   through	   contracting	   external	   consultants	   to	   assist	   in	   the	  formulation	   of	   appropriate	   policy.	   This	   is	   peculiar	   given	   the	   current	   stress	   in	   business	  circles	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  knowledge	  intensive	  activities	  and	  the	  process	  of	  learning	  in	  attaining	  manufacturing	  excellence.	  	  Furthermore,	   the	   discourse	   of	   world	   class	   manufacturing	   stresses	   that	   attaining	  knowledge	   and	   appropriately	   applying	   this	   knowledge	   is	   a	   relational,	   rather	   than	   self	  contained,	  endogenous	  activity.	  	  It	  is	  not	  only	  that	  government	  has	  to	  engage	  in	  ongoing	  learning	  and	  innovation,	  it	  also	  needs	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  who	  it	  has	  to	  learn	  from.	  Industrial	  policy	  is	  all	  too	  often	  premised	  on	  the	  notion,	  and	  unfortunately	  also	  believed	  too	  literally	  by	   government	   bureaucrats,	   that	   the	   state	   conceptualises	   the	   issues,	   provides	   the	  strategies,	  and	  then	  business	  receives	  the	  benefits.	  In	  other	  words,	  there	  are	  at	  least	  two	  parties	   in	   any	   industrial	   policy/strategy	   and	   intervention	   –	   government	   and	   industry	  stakeholders	  –	  and	  the	  process	  of	  filling	  in	  the	  details	  of	  industrial	  policy	  involves	  them	  in	  a	  mutual,	  relational,	  ‘learning’	  activity.	  Whilst	   there	   is	   some	   discussion	   about	   building	   capabilities,	   the	   issue	   of	   achieving	  systemic	  competitiveness	  between	  firms	  is	  neglected	  in	  Chang’s	  focus	  on	  targeted	  sectors	  as	  the	  essence	  of	  national	  industrial	  policy/strategy.	  The	  role	  of	  clusters	  and	  value	  chain	  alignment	  producing	  systemic	  efficiency	  between	  the	  links	  of	  the	  chain,	  as	  well	  as	  reaping	  collective	  efficiency	  gains	  through	  cooperative	  clustering	  is	  hardly	  discussed.	  Then	   there	   is	   the	   question	   of	   which	   level	   of	   the	   state	   is	   best	   placed	   to	   engage	   and	  intervene?	   Most	   discussion	   of	   industrial	   policy	   operates	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	  central,	  national	  government	  and	  national	  sectors.	  But	  firms,	  even	  if	  they	  operate	  within	  national	   and	   transnational	   markets,	   exist	   and	   are	   embedded	   within	   defined	   localities.	  Central	   government	   is	   often	   too	   far	   away	   and	   distant	   from	   firms	   to	   be	   sectorally	  embedded	   in	   their	   needs,	   problems,	   requirements,	   and	   cluster	   activities.	   As	   a	   result	  central	  government	  finds	  that	  it	  lacks	  the	  institutional	  intimacy	  to	  appropriately	  monitor	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and	   appreciate	   successes,	   and	   track	   the	   enterprises	   movement	   towards	   international	  competitiveness.	   	   Central	   government’s	   tendency	   to	   concentrate	   resources	   and	   set	   up	  bureaucratically	   obstructive	   accessing	   mechanisms	   can	   also	   have	   a	   major	   debilitating	  impact	   on	   the	   ability	   of	   firms	   to	   gain	   from	   industrial	   policy	   arrangements.	  Distant	   and	  unresponsive	   centralised	   bureaucratic	   structures	   do	   little	   to	   enhance	   the	   building	   of	  relations	  essential	  to	  the	  uptake	  of	  programmes	  deemed	  national	  priorities3.	  	  	  In	   short,	   space	   barriers,	   distance	   and	   limited	   contact	   between	   firms	   and	   central	  government	  officials	  limit	  trust,	  mutual	  learning	  and	  effective	  implementation.	  	  Often,	  but	  not	  always,	   this	  can	  be	  overcome	  by	  provincial	  and	   local	  governments,	  which	  are	  more	  embedded	  in	  the	  industries	  under	  their	  purview,	  assuming	  greater	  authority.	  Provided	  of	  course	   that	   provincial	   governments	   are	   held	   accountable	   for	   provincial	   economic	  development.	  Being	  able	  to	  create	  greater	  institutional	  intimacy	  with	  industry	  they	  are	  in	  a	  position	  to	  jointly	  formulate	  more	  appropriately	  designed	  industrial	  policies,	  set	  more	  realistic	  priorities	  for	  the	  areas	  they	  exercise	  governance	  over,	  and	  implement	  realisable	  industrial	   strategies.	   We	   stress	   that	   this	   is	   not	   always	   the	   case,	   since	   incompetent	   or	  corrupt	  administrations	  can	  also	  simply	  use	  their	  closeness	  to	  local	  enterprises	  to	  engage	  in	  rent	  seeking	  behaviour.	  	  	  	  This	   issue	   of	   implementation	   failure	   is	   the	   fourth	   dimension	   that	   orthodox	   industrial	  policy/strategy	   proponents	   have	   to	   consider.	   	   Government	   learning	   in	   respect	   of	  industrial	  policy	  is	  not	  confined	  to	  formulating	  policy	  about	  formulation	  what	  is	  required	  to	  be	  done;	  it	  is	  also	  fundamentally	  an	  implementation	  issue	  –	  i.e.	  where	  to	  intervene	  and	  	  
how	  to	  go	  about	  doing	  so.	  	  This	   requires	   institutionalising	   a	   learning	   process	   between	   government	   and	   industry.	  Furthermore	  there	  is	  little	  point	  in	  setting	  out	  an	  industrial	  policy	  requiring	  a	  variety	  of	  interventions	   if	   the	   implementation	   capacity	   in	   government	   does	   not	   match	   the	  requirements.	   But	   all	   too	   often	   available	   capacity	   is	   not	   the	   realistic	   starting	   point.	  Instead	   elaborate,	   elegant	   and	   sophisticated	   industrial	   policy	  measures	   are	   formulated	  with	  no	  realistic	  prioritisation	  based	  on	  existing	  capacity	  and	  the	  necessary	  institutional	  arrangements	  to	  implement	  them.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Helmsing goes so far as to claim that “… the only justifiable form of industrial (trade) policy is in fact 
regional industrial development policy.” Helmsing (2001)	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An	  alternative	  to	  the	  orthodoxy	  Essentially,	  in	  setting	  up	  the	  duality	  between	  industrial	  policy	  and	  the	  market,	  both	  sides4	  of	   this	   debate	   have	   also	   set	   up	   a	   polarity	   of	   government	   intervention	   versus	   business	  activity.	  One	  seemingly	  has	   to	  choose	   -­‐	  either	   the	  state	   is	  paramount	  or	  business	   is	   left	  alone	  to	  go	  about	  its	  business.	  	  In	   contrast,	   Dani	   Rodrik	   has	   attempted	   to	   escape	   this	   polarity	   and	   provide	   a	   very	  different	   approach	   to	   industrial	   policy5.	   This	   approach	   stresses	   the	   importance	   of	   the	  relational	  interdependency	  between	  state	  and	  business,	  the	  necessity	  but	  uncertainty	  of	  any	   state	   directed	   interventions,	   and	   hence	   the	   crucial	   role	   of	   learning	   in	   the	   process.	  Indeed	  the	  essence	  of	  industrial	  policy	  is	  not	  to	  treat	  it	  as	  a	  fixed	  static	  state	  but	  rather	  as	  an	  institutionally	  embedded	  process.  For	  Rodrik	   (2007),	   industrial	  policy	   is	   first	  and	   foremost	  about	  getting	   the	  appropriate	  information	  and	  establishing	  a	  relational	  process	  of	  learning:	  	  
industrial	   policy	   is	   ..	   a	   discovery	   process	   ..	   where	   firms	   and	   ..	   government	   learn	   about	  underlying	  costs	  and	  opportunities	  and	  engage	  in	  strategic	  coordination…	  I	  start	  also	  from	  generic	  market	   failures,	   but	   then	   I	   take	   it	   as	   a	   given	   that	   the	   location	   and	  magnitude	   of	  these	  market	  failures	  is	  highly	  uncertain.	  …..	  the	  task	  of	  industrial	  policy	  is	  as	  much	  about	  eliciting	  information	  from	  the	  private	  sector	  on	  significant	  externalities	  and	  their	  remedies	  as	  it	  is	  about	  implementing	  appropriate	  policies.	  	  	  Hence	  the	  importance	  of	  understanding	  that	  the	  state	  cannot	  achieve	  its	  industrial	  policy	  aims	  on	   its	  own	  and	  requires	  a	  reciprocal	  relationship	  with	  business.	  Government	  does	  not	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  ‘know’	  a	  priori	  what	  is	  required:	  	  
“The	   right	  model	   for	   industrial	  policy	   is	  not	   that	  of	   an	  autonomous	  government	   applying	  Pigovian	   taxes	  or	   subsidies,	   but	  of	   strategic	   collaboration	  between	   the	  private	   sector	  and	  the	   government	   with	   the	   aim	   of	   uncovering	   where	   the	   most	   significant	   obstacles	   to	  restructuring	  lie	  and	  what	  type	  of	  interventions	  are	  most	  likely	  to	  remove	  them.	  The	  consequence	  of	   this	  model	   is	   that	   industrial	  policy	  has	   to	   shift	   its	   traditional	   focus	  away	  from	  prior	  known	  targets	  and	  towards	  a	  process	  of	  mutual	  learning	  and	  reciprocal	  determination	  of	  problems	  as	  well	  as	  solutions:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   Justin	   Lin	   2009),	   attempts	   to	  marry	   these	   two	   positions	  with	   his	   concept	   of	   the	   state	   as	   a	   ‘facilitating	  midwife’	   rather	   than	   a	   ‘defying	   nursemaid’.	   His	   view	   is	   firmly	   anchored	   in	   a	   comparative	   advantage	  perspective	   with	   marginal	   state	   interventions	   based	   on	   existing	   endowments	   with	   the	   private	   sector	  playing	  a	  major	  role.	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  instead	  of	  Korea	  the	  empirical	  reference	  becomes	  China.	  	  	  5	   There	   are	   other	   authors	   that	   have	   also	   attempted	   to	   escape	   the	   dichotomous	   terms	   of	   this	   industrial	  policy	  debate	  –	  e.g.	  Evans	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  embedded	  autonomy	  to	  name	  just	  one.	  I	  use	  Rodrik	  because	  in	  my	  opinion	  his	  is	  the	  most	  clearly	  articulated	  policy	  framework.	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industrial	   policy	   needs	   to	   focus	   not	   on	   the	   policy	   outcomes—which	   are	   inherently	  unknowable	  ex	  ante—but	  on	  getting	  the	  policy	  process	  right.	  ….	  	  how	  we	  design	  a	  setting	  in	   which	   private	   and	   public	   actors	   come	   together	   to	   solve	   problems	   in	   the	   productive	  sphere,	  each	  side	  learning	  about	  the	  opportunities	  and	  constraints	  faced	  by	  the	  other.	  	  With	  this	  emphasis	  on	  process,	   learning,	  and	  strategic	  collaboration,	   it	   is	  not	  surprising	  that	  Rodrik	  therefore	  also	  stresses	  the	  importance	  of	  picking	  the	  right	  parts	  and	  levels	  of	  the	  government	  in	  implementing	  appropriate	  industrial	  policy:	  	  
Typically,	   you	   have	   to	   look	   for	   parts	   of	   the	   government	   where	   there	   is	   bureaucratic	  competence,	  where	  there	  is	  professional	  expertise	  with	  certain	  amount	  of	  autonomy.	  And	  I	  think,	  where	  you	  have	  those,	  programs	  like	  these	  can	  be	  undertaken.	  It	  will	  never	  look	  the	  same	  way	  from	  one	  country	  to	  another.	  ….	  Particularly,	  this	  will	  depend	  a	  lot	  on	  where	  the	  capacity	  in	  the	  system,	  in	  the	  public	  sector,	  is	  really	  located..	  So	  in	  summary,	  Rodrik	  argues	  that	  there	  are	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  generic	  market	  failures	  and	  externalities	   –	   indeed	   a	  wider	   range	  with	   a	  more	   constraining	   impact	   on	   development	  than	  has	  hitherto	  been	  recognised.	  The	  location	  and	  magnitude	  of	  these	  failures	  is	  highly	  uncertain.	  Hence	  the	  argument	  for	  an	  active	  role	  for	  government	  is	  precisely	  because	  of	  the	  wide	  ranging	  extent	  of	  market	   failure.	  But	  Rodrick	  also	  recognises	  the	  possibility	  of	  government	   failure	   is	   very	   real.	   Nevertheless,	   he	   argues	   that	   the	   limitations	   on	  government	   in	  accessing	   the	  necessary	   information	  can	  be	  very	  considerably	  alleviated	  through	   the	   development	   of	   appropriate	   processes	   and	   institutions.	   Thus,	   the	  considerable	  emphasis	  on	  institutional	  design	  in	  his	  theoretical	  framework,	  part	  of	  which	  is	   precisely	   built	   around	   the	   importance	   of	   creating	   the	   conditions	   for	   learning	   and	  accessing	  information	  between	  private	  and	  public	  sector.	  	  The	  private	  sector	  has	  far	  better,	  albeit	  also	  imperfect,	  knowledge	  than	  the	  government.	  The	   key	   issue	   that	   institutional	   design	   has	   to	   grapple	   with	   is	   how	   to	   ensure	   that	  government	  can	  access	  and	  learn	  from	  the	   information	  possessed	  by	  the	  private	  sector.	  Simultaneously,	  the	  private	  sector	  needs	  to	  be	  well-­‐informed	  about	  government	  policies	  and	   limitations	   since	   government	   has	   an	   important	   impact	   on	   their	   behaviour.	   This	   is	  why	   institutional	  design	  which	  facilitates	   learning	  and	   information	  flow	  is	  so	   important	  for	   effective	   industrial	   policy	   and	   strategy.	   Organisations	   and	   processes	   which	   bring	  government	   and	   business	   into	   a	   dialogue	   have	   to	   be	   designed	   so	   that	   government	   can	  access	  information	  and	  to	  act	  effectively	  on	  it,	  and,	  reciprocally	  so	  that	  business	  can	  have	  knowledge	  of	  governmental	  policies	  and	  capacities.	  Finally	  the	  ultimate	  aim	  of	  industrial	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policy	   is	   international	   competitiveness	   -­‐	   to	   build	   firm	   level	   capability	   and	   value	   chain	  alignment	  in	  order	  to	  create	  individual	  and	  systemic	  competitiveness.	  	  
PART	  2:	  TWO	  PRACTICAL	  EXAMPLES	  In	  this	  next	  section	  I	  sketch	  out	  in	  summary	  form	  two	  practical	  examples	  of	  building	  state	  and	   private	   sector	   capacity	   around	   what	   I	   have	   termed	   an	   alternative	   (relational	   or	  embedded)	   form	   of	   industrial	   policy.	   The	   first	   is	   	   a	   regional/local	   industrial	   policy	  formulated	   and	   implemented	   by	   the	   Western	   Cape	   province	   government	   from	   2005	  onwards.	   The	   second	   example	   is	   a	   national	   sector	   policy	   for	   the	   clothing	   and	   textile	  industry.	   Notwithstanding	   their	   undoubted	   success	   as	   exercises	   in	   industrial	   policy	  formation	   I	   also	   raise	   a	   number	   of	   political	   problems	   that	   threaten	   their	   long	   term	  viability	  and	  ultimate	  success.	  
The	  Western	  Cape	  Micro-­‐Economic	  Development	  Policy	  This	  provincial	  industrial	  policy	  (called	  the	  MEDS)6	  was	  formulated	  by	  a	  combination	  of	  a	  small	   committee	   of	   external	   experts7	   working	   with	   government	   bureaucrats	   in	   the	  provincial	  department	  of	  economic	  development.	   It	  explicitly	  rejected	  the	  top-­‐down	  old	  approach.	   The	  MEDS	  was	   premised	   on	   the	   recognition	   of	   the	   existence	   of	   both	  market	  failure	   and	   institutional	   failure,	   and	   hence	   the	   need	   to	   create	   specific	   institutional	  instruments	   to	   deliver	   public	   goods,	   coordinate	   network	   alignment,	   and	   meet	   market	  needs.	   	   It	   accorded	   primary	   importance	   to	   establishing	   an	   institutional	   environment	  between	   government	   and	   industry,	   which	   prioritized	   the	   needs	   of	   firms	   as	   well	   as	  creating	   an	   enabling	   environment	   for	   the	   co-­‐evolution	   of	   policy	   and	   instruments	   for	  support.	  	  In	   line	   with	   the	   principles	   governing	   its	   industrial	   policy	   -­‐	   creating	   public/private	  linkages,	  learning	  from	  the	  private	  sector,	  and	  acknowledging	  the	  capacity	  limitations	  of	  government	  –	  the	  MEDS	  conceived	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  rather	  than	  government	  as	  best	  situated	   to	   identify	   constraints,	  obstacles	  and	  opportunities.	  Hence	   it	  was	  accorded	   the	  leading	  role	  in	  developing	  the	  specifics	  of	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  industrial	  strategy.	  The	  institutional	  framework	  was	  structured	  so	  that	  government	  should	  work	  very	  closely	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  For	  detail	  on	  the	  MEDS	  see	  the	  Kaplan	  et	  al	  2010.	  7	  I	  was	  one	  of	  four	  experts	  called	  the	  Oversight	  Committee	  of	  the	  MEDS.	  From	  2005	  -­‐	  2010	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with,	  and	  take	  the	  lead	  from,	  the	  private	  sector	  in	  various	  key	  sectors,	  designing	  policies	  to	  address	  the	  short	  and	  long	  term	  sectoral	  needs	  of	  industry,	  without	  this	  entailing	  that	  government	  was	  simply	  doing	  the	  bidding	  of	  business.	  	  The	   first	   goal	   and	   task	   was	   to	   attempt	   to	   identify	   sectors	   where	   growth	   can	   be	  significantly	   enhanced	   through	   government	   assistance.	   The	   explicit	   rationale	   was	   that	  without	  industry	  buy-­‐in	  industrial	  policy/strategy	  is	  unlikely	  to	  work. The	  private	  sector	  therefore,	  rather	  than	  government,	  should	  play	  the	   leading	  role	   in	  this	  process,	  without	  relegating	  government	  to	  the	  back	  burner.	  For,	  the	  rationale	  was	  that	  the	  identification	  of	  new	   opportunities	   and	   the	   design	   and	   implementation	   of	   specific	   sectoral	   strategies	  should	   be	   a	   joint	   endeavour	   of	   the	   provincial	   government	   working	   together	   with	   the	  private	   sector.	   Furthermore,	   the	   process	   of	   implementation	   was	   understood	   as	   an	  iterative	  one,	   involving	  an	  ongoing	  process	  of	   learning	  as	   the	  strategy	  unfolded.	  Rather	  than	  assuming	  a	  priori	  answers	  to	  all	  issues,	  it	  explicitly	  attempted	  to	  avoid	  producing	  a	  comprehensive	   directory	   of	   possible	   policies	   which,	   like	   the	   ‘yellow	   pages’,	   eager	   civil	  servants	  can	  thumb	  through	  to	  find	  this	  or	  that	  detailed	  intervention. This	   process	   of	   ‘working	   together’	   was	   effected	   through	   specially	   set	   up	   institutions	  embodying	  a	  public-­‐private	  partnership	  -­‐	  ‘sector	  forums’	  or	  independent	  ‘special	  purpose	  vehicles’	   (SPVs)	   -­‐	   to	   bring	   together	   government	   and	   industry.	   These	   institutional	  arrangements	   were	   intended	   to	   ensure	   learning	   and	   transfer	   of	   knowledge	   about	   the	  needs	   of	   the	   stakeholders	   in	   the	   specific	   sectors	   identified	   for	   support,	   maintain	  continuous	  buy-­‐in	  from	  the	  key	  stakeholders	  as	  the	  process	  unfolded,	  allow	  for	  flexibility	  in	   the	   identification	  of	  key	  areas	  of	   intervention	  as	  conditions	  altered,	  and	   finally	  avoid	  the	  funding	  bottlenecks	  associated	  with	  overly	  bureaucratic	  government	  procedures.	  	  These	  SPVs	  were	  the	  institutional	  mechanisms	  enabling	  provincial	  government	  to	  assist	  industry	   meet	   specific	   sectoral	   needs	   and	   achieve	   firm	   competitiveness.	   They	   did	   this	  through	   facilitating	   the	   alignment	   between	   sector	   firms	   and	   provincial	   government,	   as	  well	  as	  assisting	  firm/enterprises	  to	  cooperate	  with	  each	  other.	  SPVs	  were	  constituted	  to	  include	  industry	  and	  government	  department	  stakeholders	  on	  their	  boards,	  to	  which	  they	  were	   jointly	  accountable.	  They	  were	  required	   to	  consult	  broadly	  and	   frequently	  among	  member	  firms	  and	  then	  report	  on	  their	  needs	  and	  design	  support	  mechanisms	  to	  address	  these	   needs.	   The	   SPVs	   became	   the	   focal	   point	   of	   learning,	   dialogue	   and	   information	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exchange	  between	  the	  private	  sector	  and	  government,	   led	  by	  the	  former,	  in	  formulating	  policy	  plans.	  SPVs	  therefore	  allowed	  for	  the	  co-­‐evolution	  of	  policy	  and	  industrial	  support	  initiatives.	   In	   addition	   they	   were	   also	   the	   knowledge	   point	   for	   ensuring	   that	  implementation	  plans	  were	  grounded	  in,	  and	  backed	  by,	  a	  public/private	  partnership	  to	  raise	   the	   chances	   of	   their	   success.	   Given	   the	   limitations	   of	   government	   capacity,	   SPVs	  were	  expected	  to	  carry	  much	  of	  the	  burden	  of	  industrial	  policy	  –	  its	  evolution	  as	  well	  as	  strategic	  implementation.	  The	  SPVs	  are	  in	  effect	  development	  councils	  for	  their	  industry.	  They	   are	   the	   most	   important	   mechanism	   for	   ensuring	   that	   industrial	   policy	   remains	  relevant	  and	  responsive	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  firms	  and	  sectors	  it	  is	  designed	  to	  support.	  	  Many	  government	  industrial	  policies	  are	  devised	  in	  the	  abstract	  based	  on	  first	  principles,	  and	   conceptualised	   as	   if	   the	   capacity	   issues	   to	   implement	   them	   were	   someone	   else’s	  problem.	  Rather	  than	  adopting	  this	  approach,	  the	  MEDS	  started	  from	  the	  principle	  that	  a	  policy	   or	   strategy	   has	   to	   take	   into	   account	   the	   existing	   and	   likely	   institutional	  arrangements	   available	   to	   implement	   it.	   There	   is	   no	   point	   in	   devising	   an	   elegant,	  academically	  advanced	  industrial	  policy/strategy	  which	  requires	  an	  unattainable	  level	  of	  expertise	  and/or	   large	  numbers	  of	   civil	   servants	   in	  government	   to	  make	   it	  operational.	  	  Provincial	   government	   has	   a	   limited	   budget,	   a	   defined	   civil	   service	   salary	   budget	   that	  makes	   it	  hard	   to	  attract	   skilled	   staff	  particularly	   from	   the	  business	   sector,	   and	  exhibits	  high	   staff	   turnover.	   Hence	   in	   reality	   it	   often	   operates	   with	   severe	   skill	   shortages	   and	  insufficient	  capacity.	  The	  MEDS	  therefore	  operated	  on	  the	  principle	  of	  ‘cutting	  your	  coat	  according	  to	  your	  cloth’.	  It	  consciously	  tried	  to	  avoid	  formulating	  industrial	  policy	  based	  on	   the	   political	   ‘wish	   lists’	   of	   government	   or	   the	   sophisticated	   policy	   programmes	   of	  consultants.	   Instead	   it	   purposively	   limited	   its	   scope	   and	   breadth,	   and	   tailored	   its	  government	  interventions	  in	  line	  with	  the	  actual	  capacity	  of	  government	  to	  implement	  its	  proposals.	  	  Hence	   a	   few	   priority	   sectors	   meriting	   particular	   attention	   were	   identified	   based	   on	  specific	  goals	  of	  potential	  growth	  and	  equity	  criteria.	  The	  key	  issue	  here	  was	  to	  avoid	  the	  all	  encompassing	  wish	  list	  syndrome	  and	  to	  take	  account	  of	  limited	  capacity,	  all	  of	  which	  would	  simply	  result	  in	  a	  dilution	  of	  priorities,	  dissipation	  of	  focus,	  and	  an	  inability	  to	  act	  effectively	  with	  limited	  resources.	   	  What	  followed	  from	  the	  latter	  was	  implementing	  the	  principle	  of	  ‘achieving	  the	  greatest	  bang	  of	  the	  buck’	  to	  decide	  on	  which	  sectors	  would	  be	  prioritised.	   Sectors	   that	   had	   high	   potential,	   that	   were	   susceptible	   to	   policy	   and	  where	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resource	  costs	  were	  likely	  to	  be	  limited,	  would	  qualify	  as	  potential	  priorities.	  Finally	  the	  presence	   of	   existing	   forms	   of	   private	   sector	   organisation	   (industry	   associations,	   sector	  forums,	   sector	   based	   development	   organisations)	   with	   significant	   representation	   and	  embeddedness,	  which	   could	   embody	   a	   sector	   strategy,	   provide	   legitimacy	   and	   act	   as	   a	  driver,	  was	  a	  key	  basis	  for	  making	  a	  decision	  to	  prioritise	  a	  particular	  sector.	  In	   the	   policy	   framework	   those	   sectors	   selected	   were	   categorised	   in	   terms	   of	   levels	   of	  priority	   with	   differentials	   types	   of	   designated	   support.	   The	   highest	   level	   were	   a	   small	  number	  of	  ‘flagship	  sectors’	  which	  were	  earmarked	  to	  receive	  multi-­‐faceted	  government	  support	   –	   finance,	   training,	   infrastructure,	   promotion	   etc.	   -­‐	   over	   a	   number	   of	   years.	  Government	   was	   committed	   to	   building	   and	   providing	   capacity	   in	   the	   form	   of	   a	  designated	  “desk”,	  staffed	  by	  knowledgeable	  personnel	  that	  were	  specifically	  dedicated	  to	  providing	  consistent	  and	  continuous	  support	  for	  that	  particular	  sector.	  The	  rationale	  was	  that	   the	   continuous	   interaction	  would	   build	   on	   and	  provide	   the	   necessary	   institutional	  intimacy	  to	  ensure	  confidence	  and	  sustained	  interactive	  learning	  between	  the	  private	  and	  the	   public	   sector.	   If	   one	   accepts	   the	   limitations	   of	   government’s	   capacity	   as	   one	   of	   the	  starting	  points	  of	  industrial	  policy,	  then	  an	  important	  role	  of	  such	  interventions	  must	  be	  to	  also	  grow	  this	  capacity	  in	  terms	  of	  resources,	  people	  and	  capabilities.	  The	  expansion	  of	  government	   capacity,	   through	   an	   iterative	   learning	   process,	   which	   also	   grew	   sectoral	  capabilities	  was	  thus	  an	  important	  goal	  of	  MEDS.	  	  This	   was	   regarded	   as	   a	   critical	   objective	   to	   create	   a	   stable	   and	   credible	   policy	  environment,	   providing	   firms	   with	   considerable	   certainty	   regarding	   the	   availability	   of	  resources	  and	  personnel.	  Without	  such	  stability,	  embodied	  in	  a	  focused,	  consistent	  policy	  environment,	   and	   an	   appropriate	   institutional	   form,	   government	   personnel	   could	   not	  learn,	   develop	   their	   industry	   analytic	   capacities	   in	   any	   sustainable	   form.	   This	   is	  particularly	  important	  given	  the	  general	  tendency	  to	  swap	  government	  personnel	  about,	  within	  and	  between	  departments.	  	  	  Having	   ‘flagship	  desks’	  heavily	  backed	  by	  high	   level	  political	  support	  was	  also	  regarded	  as	  a	  way	  to	  overcome	  the	  dislocated	  nature	  of	  government	  operations.	  The	  problems	  that	  firms	   face	   do	   not	   exhibit	   themselves	   in	   the	   neatly	   packaged	   silos	   of	   government	  departments.	   	   They	   cut	   across	   the	   spheres	   and	   competencies	   of	   departments	   and	  ministries,	  and	  addressing	  constraints	  often	  requires	  policy	  changes	  and	  interventions	  in	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a	   wide	   variety	   of	  ministries	   –	   e.g.	   education,	   labour,	   police	   and	   criminal	   justice,	   home	  affairs	   and	   transport,	   to	   name	   only	   the	   most	   obvious.	   	   For	   example	   the	   operational	  performance	   of	   these	   firms	   may	   be	   disadvantaged	   by	   inadequate	   public	   transport	   or	  energy	  malfunction	  or	  targeted	  criminal	  activity,	  all	  of	  which	  require	  rapid	  response	  but	  which	  is	  difficult	  to	  get	  action	  on	  because	  of	  the	  silo	  nature	  of	  government.	  The	  concept	  of	  a	   dedicated	   ‘desk’	   with	   high	   level	   political	   backing	   was	   intended	   to	   overcome	   such	  problems,	  allowing	  knowledgeable	  personnel	  to	  move	  seamlessly	  between	  departments,	  rapidly	   intervening	   to	   solve	   particular	   problems	   and	   overcome	   constraints.	   Being	  familiar	   with	   the	   key	   participants	   in	   the	   selected	   industry	   and	   able	   to	   pick	   up	   issues	  easily,	   such	   personnel	   should	   immediately	   be	   in	   a	   position	   to	   take	   constraints	   and	  obstacles	  to	  a	  higher	  level	  in	  order	  to	  get	  them	  dealt	  with.	  	  In	   turn	   the	   SPVs	   understood	   the	   industrial	   policy/strategy	   not	   as	   a	   fixed	   ‘plan’	   but	   as	  embodying	  process,	  engagement	  and	  learning.	  Rather	  than	  viewing	  the	  MEDS	  as	  a	  set	  of	  codified	   policy	   prescriptions,	   they	   saw	   it	   as	   the	   mechanism	   to	   establish	   relationships	  between	   government	   and	   the	   private	   sector.	   Likewise	   their	   own	   obligation	   and	  responsibility	   lay	   in	   providing	   the	   institutional	   nexus	   where	   this	   process	   of	   learning,	  policy	  reformulation	  and	  strategic	  intervention	  by	  government	  and	  industry	  could	  occur.	  	  In	  summary	  these	  institutional	  arrangements	  for	  an	  alternative	  industrial	  policy.strategy	  in	  the	  province	  were	  able	  to	  meet	  a	  number	  of	  critical	  industrial	  policy	  goals:	  	  
o Because	   of	   their	   institutional	   intimacy,	   they	   ensured	   the	   institutionalisation	   of	  
learning	   and	   transfer	   of	   knowledge	   about	   the	   needs	   of	   the	   stakeholders	   in	   the	  specific	  sectors	  identified	  for	  support.	  	  
o They	   maintained	   continuous	   buy-­in	   from	   the	   key	   industry	   stakeholders	   as	   the	  industrial	  policy	  process	  unfolds	  and	  private	  sector	  participants	  are	  always	  able	  to	  feel	  relevant	  and	  consulted.	  
o From	  an	  implementation	  perspective,	  their	  independence	  of	  government	  red	  tape	  and	   procedures	   allowed	   for	   flexibility	   in	   the	   identification	   of	   key	   areas	   of	  
intervention	   as	   conditions	   alter.	   The	   presence	   of	   representative	   private	   sector	  actors	  in	  the	  institutions	  meant	  that	  these	  special	  purpose	  vehicles	  should	  be	  able	  to	  rapidly	  learn	  what	  areas	  to	  intervene	  in,	  tackle	  potential	  obstacles	  flexibly,	  and	  act	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  opportunities.	  	  
o They	   were	   able	   to	   avoid	   the	   funding	   bottlenecks	   associated	   with	   overly	  bureaucratic	   central	   government	   procedures.	   Using	   the	   core	   funds	   provided	   by	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provincial	  government	  they	  were	  able	  to	  leverage	  additional	  funding	  from	  a	  broad	  rage	  of	  other	  private	  and	  public	  sector	  bodies	  to	  significantly	  ramp	  up	  their	  range,	  scope	  and	  spread	  of	  activities.	  	  
o Designated	   lower	   tier	  government	  officials	  were	  closer	   to	   the	   firms	   in	  a	  particular	  targeted	   sector	   and	   hence	   were	   better	   positioned	   to	  manage	   and	   address	   their	  issues	  and	  provide	  rapid	  action.	  	  
o This	   structurally	   helped	   to	   build	   internal	   capacity	   in	   government	   through	  specialised	  ‘desks’.	  	  Obviously	  all	  this	  could	  only	  work	  if	  these	  ‘sector	  bodies’	  (e.g.	  Special	  Purpose	  Vehicles)	  -­‐the	   focal	   point	   of	   information,	   learning,	   and	   dialogue	   between	   the	   private	   sector	   and	  government	   -­‐	   formed	   a	   central	   plank	   of	   the	   industrial	   policy	   and	   its	   implementation	  strategy.	   Provincial	   government	   was	   able	   to	   feel	   confident	   in	   granting	   them	   funding	  support,	   since	   it	  also	  became	  the	  sector	  bodies	   task	   to	  ensure	   that	   the	  programme	  was	  carried	   out	   according	   to	   the	   criteria	   set	   out	   and	   that	   and	   monies	   were	   being	   spent	  effectively.	  Given	   the	   limitations	  of	   government	   capacity,	   in	   this	  way	   the	   sector	  bodies,	  comprising	  a	  public/private	  partnership,	  but	  led	  by	  the	  private	  sector	  carried	  much	  of	  the	  burden	  of	  regional	  industrial	  policy	  –	  its	  design	  as	  well	  as	  implementation	  –	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  sectors	  in	  the	  province.	  
Politics	  and	  the	  MEDS	  Generally	   speaking	   the	  MEDS	  has	  been	  a	   relatively	   successful	  piece	  of	   industrial	   policy	  design	   and	   implementation8.	   However	   there	   have	   been	   a	   number	   of	   problems.	   	   Apart	  from	   the	  usual	   and	   expected	   teething	  problems	  most	   of	   these	   these	   lay	   in	   institutional	  issues	  of	  alignment	  between	  the	  regional	  government	  and	  the	  SPVs.	  Many	  of	  these	  can	  be	  analysed	   in	   terms	   of	   institutional	   blockages,	   capacity	   problems,	   difficulty	   in	   attracting	  and	  holding	  good	  SPV	  managers,	  some	  poor	  functioning	  SPVs,	  or	  lack	  of	  resources	  etc.	  It	  is	  not	  my	  intention	  to	  lay	  these	  out	  here.	  They	  have	  been	  covered	  in	  a	  number	  of	  reports	  to	  the	  provincial	  government	  and	  many	  of	  the	  pertinent	  issues	  are	  published	  in	  the	  MEDS	  Composite	   Report	   (2010).	   	   Some	   however	   pertain	   directly	   to	   the	   influence,	   or	  interference,	   of	   directly	   political	   processes.	   It	   is	   to	   these	   issues	   of	   the	   politics	   of	  implementation	  that	  we	  now	  turn.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  In	  March	  2010	  an	  International	  Peer	  Review	  Panel	  produced	  a	  very	  favourable	  evaluation	  of	  the	  MEDS	  as	  an	   industrial	   policy	   framework	   –	   its	   formulation	   and	   design	   rather	   than	   implementation.	   The	   principal	  reports	  by	  Raphie	  Kaplinsky	  and	  Hubert	  Schmitz	  are	  available	  as	  an	  appendix	  to	  the	  Composite	  Report.	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The	  politics	  of	  industrial	  policy	  tends	  to	  be	  seen	  by	  economists	  as	  equivalent	  to	  issues	  of	  policy	   formulation	  and	  design	  –	   for	  example	  where	  one	  stands	   in	  respect	  of	   the	   limited	  intervention,	   free	  market	   friendly,	  state	  versus	  the	   interventionist,	  developmental	  state.	  My	   concern	   here	   is	   rather	   to	   summarise	   some	   of	   the	   issues	   around	   the	   influence	   of	  politics	   on	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   MEDS	   as	   an	   accepted	   industrial	   policy.	   In	   my	  descriptive	  discussion	  and	  analysis	  that	  follows	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  group	  the	  numerous	  issues	  of	   empirical	   detail	   into	   two	   broad	   categories	   of	   ‘politics’	   in	   order	   to	  make	   them	  more	  generalisable.	  These	  are	  politics	  in	  a	  broad	  sense	  deriving	  from	  ideological	  frameworks,	  and	  politics	  of	  the	  small	  derived	  from	  administrative	  institutional	  conflicts	  and	  interests.	  I	  also	  discuss	  these	  in	  terms	  of	  two	  separate	  periods	  under	  different	  political	  party	  regimes	  in	  the	  life	  of	  the	  MEDS.	  The	   alternative	   model	   of	   industrial	   policy	   outlined	   and	   put	   into	   practice	   in	   the	   MEDS	  requires	  a	  particular	  brand	  of	  politics	  on	  the	  part	  of	  those	  bureaucrats	  exercising	  power	  over	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  MEDS.	  The	  period	  within	  which	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  MEDS	  was	  put	   into	  place	   occurred	  under	   an	  ANC	  dominated	  provincial	   government	   (2004	   to	  the	  March	  2009).	  The	  upper	  echelons	  of	  the	  department	  of	  economic	  development	  –	  both	  politically	  appointed	  civil	  servants	  and	  politicians	  –	  expressed	  wholehearted	  support	  for	  the	  particular	  brand	  of	   industrial	  policy	   characterising	   the	  MEDS.	  Without	   this	   support	  the	   MEDS	   would	   never	   have	   seen	   the	   light	   of	   day	   and	   been	   allowed	   to	   grow	   into	   a	  successful	   industrial	   strategy.	   They	   seemingly	   bought	   into	   this	   idea	   of	   a	   relational	  industrial	  policy,	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  more	  commandist	  role	  of	  orthodox	  industrial	  policy	  or	  a	  limited	   intervention	   (free	   market)	   model.	   This	   was	   in	   spite	   of	   the	   dominant,	   more	  commandist	   ideological	   framework	   within	   which	   the	   ANC	   was	   historically	   steeped.	  However,	  at	  critical	  moments,	  many	  of	  the	  old	  politico-­‐ideological	  instincts	  of	  this	  upper	  echelon	  came	  to	  the	  fore.	  	  The	  ANC,	  like	  most	  nationalist	  movements	  in	  Africa	  had	  a	  deeply	  ingrained,	  ideologically	  rooted,	  suspicion	  of	  capital	  which	  played	  itself	  in	  myriad	  ways.	  This	  manifested	  itself	  in	  a	  direct	   way	   in	   the	   Department	   of	   Trade	   and	   Industry	   (or	   provincial	   department	   of	  economic	  development)	  which	  struggled	  to	  understand	  that	   their	  main	  client/customer	  was	  actually	  ‘business’	  rather	  than	  an	  amorphous	  ‘the	  people’.	  They	  found	  it	  very	  difficult	  to	  accept	   in	  practice	   the	  maxim	  that	   ‘business	  proposes	  and	  government	  disposes’	  –	  an	  underlying	  rationale	  of	  the	  MEDS	  industrial	  policy	  framework.	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This	   dovetailed	  with	   the	   general	   problem	   applicable	   to	  most	   ordinary	   bureaucrats,	   an	  inherent	  unwillingness	  to	  let	  go	  of	  direct	  control	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  themselves	  and	   industry.	   They	   clearly	   saw	   the	   point	   that	   the	   essence	   of	   industrial	   policy	   requires	  long	   term	  vision	  and	  plans,	   and	   should	  not	  be	   subject	   to	   the	  vicissitudes	  of	   short	   term	  individual	   business	   decisions,	   but	   they	   struggled	   to	   take	   the	   corresponding	   step	   of	   the	  MEDS	  that	  this	  did	  not	  mean	  they	  were	  in	  full	  control	  of	  the	  long	  term	  process.	  	  This	  was	   compounded	   by	   the	   intra	   government	   struggles	  with	   the	   provincial	   treasury.	  The	   latter,	   as	   seems	   to	   be	   the	   case	   with	   all	   finance	   ministries,	   was	   inherently	   well	  disposed	   to	   a	   limited	   state	   interventionist	   modus	   operandi,	   seeking	   short	   term	  measurables	  and	  immediate	  returns	  to	  justify	  fiscal	  expenditure.	  Short	  term	  measurables	  makes	  sense	  if	  one	  is	  dealing	  with	  a	  defined	  and	  determinate	  outcome	  –	  e.g.	  a	  bridge	  or	  a	  road	   –	   but	   it	   makes	   little	   sense	   for	   evaluating	   industrial	   policy	   investment	   where	   the	  outcomes	  are	  necessarily	  longer	  term	  and	  much	  more	  diffuse.	  It	  is	  simply	  not	  possible,	  for	  example,	  to	  measure	  the	  number	  of	  jobs	  created	  by	  a	  manufacturing	  excellence	  training	  program	  for	  firms	  to	  make	  them	  more	  internationally	  competitive.	  The	  end	  result	  of	  this	  intra	   governmental	   political	   struggle	  was	   that	   the	   SPVs	  were	   subjected	   to	   filling	   in	   an	  overly	   complex	   set	   of	   unrealistic	   check	   boxes	   to	   meet	   the	   short	   term,	   measurable	  outcomes	  agenda.	  	  The	  impact	  of	  these	  two	  sets	  of	  political	  process	  interplaying	  with	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  MEDS	  policy	  design	  was	  manifested	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways.	  I	  cite	  a	  few.	  
o Ceding	  real	  control	  over	  financial	  resources	  given	  to	  the	  SPVs:	  The	  HOD	  during	  the	  latter	  part	  of	  this	  ANC	  dominated	  period	  tried	  to	  implement	  a	  system	  which	  would	  have	  substantially	  increased	  centralised	  control	  at	  the	  very	  top	  of	  the	  department.	  	  
o Listening	   to	   industry:	   Despite	   numerous	   recommendations,	   it	   took	   an	   extremely	  long	   time	   to	   get	   the	   department	   to	   consider	   redesigning	   a	   monitoring	   and	  evaluation	  system	  of	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  SPV	  programs	  based	  on	  the	  usefulness	  to	  industry	  of	  programs	  rather	  than	  ticking	  government	  check	  boxes.	  	  	  
o Learning	   from	   industry:	   When	   feeling	   threatened	   by	   new	   ideas,	   there	   was	   a	  tendency	  to	  fall	  back	  on	  the	  all	  knowing	  bureaucrat	  –	  e.g.	  ‘we	  have	  enough	  people	  in	  government	  to	  know	  what	  is	  good	  for	  industry	  in	  this	  or	  that	  sector’	  –	  despite	  a	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commitment	   at	   other	   times	   to	   the	   concept	   of	   industrial	   policy	   as	   a	   ‘learning’,	  capability	  building	  process.	  
o A	  tension	  in	  dealing	  with	  the	  Oversight	  Committee	  driving	  the	  MEDS:	  Whilst	  the	  OC	  mostly	   and	   generally	   had	   support	   from	   the	   provincial	   department	   its	   peculiar	  status,	  as	  independent	  and	  outside	  the	  remit	  of	  government	  but	  paid	  on	  contract	  by	   government	   to	   act	   as	   oversight	   of	   the	   MEDS,	   resulted	   in	   conflict	   when	   it	  pursued	  agendas	  not	  fully	  supported	  by	  the	  upper	  echelons.	  This	  was	  often	  when	  the	  OC	  felt	  the	  need	  to	  assert	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  SPVs	  against	  bureaucratic	  control.	  
o Defensiveness	  in	  respect	  of	  government	  decision	  making:	  The	  upper	  echelons	  of	  the	  department	   clearly	   felt	   that	   decision	   making	   in	   respect	   of	   SPVs	   and	   priority	  sectors	  fell	  under	  their	  sole	  remit.	  For	  most	  of	  the	  life	  span	  of	  the	  MEDS	  under	  the	  ANC	  government,	  politics	  was	  manifested	  in	  the	  above	  ways,	  subtly	  influencing	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  this	  industrial	  policy/strategy	  was	   implemented.	  However	   the	   impact	  of	  party	  politics	  was	   felt	   in	  a	  much	  more	  direct	  manner	  when	  the	  April	  2009	  elections	  resulted	  in	  a	  change	  of	  provincial	  government	  in	  the	  Western	   Cape.	   The	   ANC	   lost	   comprehensively	   and	   the	   Democratic	   Alliance	   (DA)	   a	  party	  which	  was	  explicitly	  business	   friendly	   	   took	  control	  of	   the	  provincial	  government	  with	  an	  absolute	  majority.	  This	  seismic	  shift	  in	  the	  politics	  of	  power	  has	  had	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  MEDS	  as	  an	  industrial	  policy	  over	  the	  past	  year.	  	  This	  change	  in	  political	  party	  control	  manifested	  itself	  in	  two	  ways:	  Firstly,	  an	  ideological	  struggle	  for	  the	  heart	  and	  soul	  of	  the	  MEDS.	  Secondly,	  departmental	  paralysis	  as	  a	  direct	  effect	  of	  a	  new	  administration	  coming	  into	  power.	  It	  became	  clear	   in	  the	  first	   few	  months	  that	  there	  were	  distinct	  tendencies	  within	  some	  quarters	  of	  the	  new	  government	  which	  expressed	  a	  clear	  partiality	  for	  free	  marketeerism	  and	  limited	  state	  intervention.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  DA	  was	  business	  friendly	  meant	  that	  they	  were	  sympathetic	  to	  a	  business	  driven	  industrial	  policy,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  many	  in	  the	  party	  and	  government	  struggled	  to	  overcome	  an	  instinctive	  tendency	  to	  want	  to	  retreat	  from	  the	  state	  intervention	  that	  any	  industrial	  policy	  requires.	  The	  ideological	  issue	  here	  was	   the	   exact	   opposite	   of	   that	   prevalent	   in	   the	   previous	   period	   under	   the	   ANC	  government.	   Suddenly	   the	   very	   concept	   of	   industrial	   policy	   and	   the	   MEDS	   had	   to	   be	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justified.	  The	  OC	  and	  those	  civil	  servants	  in	  the	  department	  found	  themselves	  now	  having	  to	   fight	   a	   rearguard	   action	   defending	   and	   justifying	   the	   importance	   of,	   and	   need	   for,	  industrial	  policy	  in	  various	  forums	  set	  up	  to	  re-­‐evaluate	  policies	  and	  programs	  inherited	  from	  the	  previous	  administration.	  	  The	   fact	   that	   this	   transition	   coincided	  with	   the	   financial	   crisis	   and	   the	  need	   for	  budget	  cuts	   only	  made	   this	   covert	   political	   struggle	  more	   difficult.	   For	   the	   financial	   crisis	   also	  gave	   immense	   power	   to	   the	   provincial	   treasury	  which	  was	   demanding	   budget	   cuts	   all	  round.	  This	  reinforced	  the	  ever	  present	  demand	  for	  short	  term	  immediate	  results	  as	  the	  criteria	   for	   expenditure	   justification.	   Industrial	   policy	   and	   the	   MEDS	   became	   an	   easy	  target	   for	   those	   wanting	   cut	   budgets.	   Hence	   the	   demand	   for	   substantial	   evidence	   of	  ‘performance	  measurables’	  in	  order	  to	  justify	  allocation	  of	  budget	  to	  the	  MEDS	  industrial	  policy	  measures	  escalated.	  The	  whispered	  refrains,	  seldom	  explicitly	  articulated,	  that	  had	  to	  be	  countered	  drifted	  around	  the	  corridors:	  ‘Why	  shouldn’t	  we	  just	  give	  money	  directly	  to	  business?	  Why	  do	  we	  actually	  need	  an	  industrial	  policy?	  What	  are	  these	  SPVs	  and	  why	  give	  them	  money	  if	  they	  are	  neither	  government	  nor	  the	  private	  sector?	  And	  indeed,	  why	  do	  we	  need	  all	  these	  people	  in	  the	  department	  of	  economic	  development?’	  There	  was	  a	  certain	  irony	  in	  this	  hidden,	  intra	  governmental,	  process	  of	  political	  struggle	  over	  the	  MEDS.	  For	  the	  MEDS	  never	  really	  fitted	  comfortably	  with	  the	  general	  ideological	  framework	  of	   the	  ANC.,	  The	  DA,	  which	  was	  much	   closer	   to	  business,	   should	  have	  been	  much	  more	  at	  home	  with	  it,	  and	  more	  easily	  able	  to	  accommodate	  it,	  as	  a	  more	  business	  friendly	  framework.	  After	  all	  one	  of	  the	  MEDS’s	  fundamental	  rationales	  was	  the	  need	  for	  an	  industrial	  policy	  led	  by	  industry.	  	  The	  other	  impact	  of	  the	  change	  in	  political	  regime	  was	  an	  administrative	  one	  stemming	  from	  a	  new	  government.	  This	  would	  not	  have	  had	  a	  political	  effect	  on	  the	  administration	  of	   the	   department	   if	   the	   bureaucracy	   had	   remained	   stable.	   However	   the	   departmental	  head	  of	  economic	  development	   inherited	  from	  the	  new	  regime	  was	  also	  simultaneously	  shifted	  sideways	  within	  a	  few	  months.	   In	   itself	   this	  was	  not	  a	  bad	  thing,	   for	  he	   lacked	  a	  power	   base	   within	   the	   staff,	   and	   this	   move	   was	   generally	   welcomed	   by	   most	   people	  associated	  with	   the	   implementation	   of	   industrial	   policy	   in	   the	   province..	   However,	   the	  cumbersome	   process	   of	   appointing	   a	   new	  Head	   took	   a	   further	   9	  months.	   Some	   of	   the	  reasons	   for	   this	   delay	   can	   be	   put	   down	   to	   individual	   naivety	   and	   administrative	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inexperience.	   However	   a	   substantial	   part	   also	   derived	   from	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   broader	  political	   terrain.	  The	  new	  administration	  wished	  to	  both	  ensure	   it	  got	  the	   ‘right’	  person	  for	   the	   job	   and	  also	   cover	   its	  political	   tracks	   in	  doing	   so,	   and	  not	  be	   seen	   to	  be	  hastily	  bringing	  in	  their	  own	  political	  appointee.	  The	  net	  effect	  however	  has	  been	  an	  inability	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  upper	  echelons	  of	  the	  department	  to	  exercise	  the	  necessary	  leadership	  to	  provide	   consistent	   and	   continuous	   support	   for	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   MEDS	  industrial	  policy	  measures.	  In	  effect	  the	  department	  of	  economic	  development	  spent	  the	  first	  year	  of	  a	  new	  political	  administration,	  where	  it	  was	  fighting	  for	  its	  lifeblood	  and	  that	  of	  the	  MEDS,	  without	  any	  real	  effective,	  stable	  and	  strong	  leadership.	  	  The	  impact	  on	  the	  internal	  coherence	  of	  the	  department	   of	   economic	  development	   (and	  hence	   the	  MEDS	   also)	  was	   severe.	   In	   some	  respects	   it	   paralysed	   activity,	   in	   others	   it	   allowed	   for	   little	   control	   over	   wayward	  activities	  of	  individuals.	  Not	  only	  did	  this	  disrupt	  the	  internal	  administrative	  mechanisms	  of	   the	   organisation,	   but	   it	   also	   meant	   the	   department	   has	   been	   a	   sitting	   duck	   for	   the	  provincial	  treasury	  to	  take	  pot	  shots	  at.	  	  The	   legitimacy	   of	   industrial	   policy	   requires	   consistent	   application,	   both	   in	   terms	   of	  	  policies	   and	   people	  who	   implement	   them.	   Apart	   from	   the	   difficulties	   in	   attracting	   and	  retaining	   the	   right	   skills,	   the	   department	   was	   not	   able	   to	   consistently	   do	   that	   for	   the	  following	  reasons:	  
o Politics	   and	   political	   struggles	   (not	   just	   between	   ANC	   and	   DA	   but	   within	   the	  political	  parties)	  interfered	  with	  the	  process.	  	  
o 	  Pressures	   from	   a	   treasury	   that	   was	   inherently	   well	   disposed	   to	   the	   ideological	  framework	  of	  limited	  state	  intervention	  and	  suspicious	  of	  industrial	  policy.	  
o The	   intra	   government	   political	   pressure	   imposed	   on	   the	   department	   to	   be	  financially	   accountable	   in	   terms	   of	   short	   term	  measurables	   skewing	   policy	   and	  ultimately	  reducing	  the	  resources	  available.	  	  In	  summary	  then,	  although	  the	  Western	  Cape	  provincial	  industrial	  policy	  is	  in	  many	  ways	  still	  vibrant	  through	  the	  flourishing	  activities	  of	  a	  number	  of	  SPVs	  on	  the	  ground,	  and	  the	  MEDS	  is	  presented	   in	  public	   forums	  as	  a	  success,	   the	  story	  of	   the	  MEDS	  illustrates	  how	  the	   vicissitudes	   of	   politics,	   and	   the	   dominance	   of	   Treasury,	   in	   the	   large	   and	   the	   small,	  constantly	  came	  in	  the	  way	  of	  defining	  a	  clear	  and	  consistent	  trajectory	  for	  policy.	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Industrial	  Policy	  for	  Clothing	  and	  Textiles	  As	   is	   obvious	   from	  Chang’s	  position,	   targeted	   sectoral	   state	   strategy	   is	   the	  heart	   of	   the	  orthodox	  industrial	  policy	  advocates.	  In	  2004	  the	  South	  African	  state	  initiated	  a	  series	  of	  sectoral	   policy	   interventions	   in	   a	   number	   of	   selected	   sectors.	   These	   were	   called	  Customised	   Sector	   Plans	   (CSP).	   	   The	   sector	   directorate	   of	   the	   DTI	   at	   this	   stage	   was	  exceptionally	  weak	  having	  undergone	  a	  process	  of	   attrition	  on	   the	  part	   of	   the	  Minister	  and	  Director	   General	   since	   1994.	   In	   effect,	   by	   2004,	   the	  Ministry	   had	   only	   one	   or	   two	  people	   (depending	   on	   how	   one	   counted)	   working	   in	   the	   C&T	   division.	   	   The	   industrial	  policy	   formulation	   process	   of	   the	   CSP	   for	   the	   clothing	   and	   textile	   (C&T)	   sector	   was	  outsourced	   to	   Justin	  Barnes	  who	  had	  extensive	   service	  provider	   experience	   in	   creating	  clusters	  and	  value	  chain	  alignment	  in	  a	  number	  of	  sectors,	  but	  especially	  the	  automobile	  and	  C&T	   industries9.	  Based	  on	  his	   experience	  he	  adopted	  an	  approach	  which	  was	  very	  similar	  to	  that	  outlined	  as	  the	  alternative	  industrial	  policy	  framework	  outlined	  above.	  10	  	  Traditionally	  these	  two	  sectors	  comprising	  the	  C&T	  industry	  had	  been	  in	  major	  conflict	  and	  unable	  to	  agree	  on	  a	  common	  platform	  to	  take	  to	  the	  state.	  Barnes	  had	  however	  been	  working	  with	  both	   the	  clothing	  and	   textile	  sectors	   in	   incipient	  clusters	  and	  was	  able	   to	  move	  seamlessly	  between	  them.	  He	  therefore	  canvassed	  the	  associations	  and	  firms	  in	  the	  two	   sectors	   on	   their	   views,	   needs,	   requirements,	   conflicts	   etc.	   He	   attempted	   to	   engage	  with	   the	   dominant	   union	   but	   despite	   numerous	   phone	   calls	   and	   emails	   received	   no	  positive	   response.	  By	  mid	  2005	  a	  draft	  CSP	  brokered	  between	   the	  various	   segments	  of	  the	  C&T	  value	  chain	  was	  ready	  to	  be	  presented	  to	  various	  stakeholders	  in	  government	  –	  departments	   and	   quasi	   parastatals.	   At	   this	   stage	   I	   was	   formally	   asked	   to	   chair	   and	  facilitate	  a	  series	  of	  workshops	  between	  industry	  stakeholders	  and	  national	  government.	  	  The	   union	   refused	   to	   attend	   these	  workshops.	   In	  mid	   June,	   at	   the	   final	   workshop,	   the	  various	  components	  were	  finally	  agreed	  between	  all	  parties	  and	  the	  CSP	  was	  sent	  to	  the	  DTI	  for	  formal	  ratification.	  	  At	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  new	  CSP	  was	  a	  public	  private	  partnership	  institution	  –	  the	  Textile	  and	  Clothing	   Development	   Council	   -­‐	   bringing	   together	   all	   industry	   and	   government	  stakeholders	   to	   develop,	  manage	   and	   implement	   a	   series	   of	   proposed	   interventions.	   It	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  See	  for	  example	  Morris	  and	  Barnes	  2007.	  Barnes	  was	  also	  responsible	  for	  creating	  the	  major	  SPV	  in	  the	  Western	  Cape	  for	  the	  clothing	  and	  textile	  sector	  –	  the	  Cape	  Clothing	  and	  Textile	  Cluster.	  10	  Although	  Barnes	  was	  the	  primary	  professional	  driving	  the	  process	  I	  was	  informally	  involved	  at	  an	  early	  stage.	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was	  a	  seemingly	  major	  achievement	  for	   industrial	  policy	  and	  government.	  The	   industry	  looked	  forward	  to	  a	  new	  era.	  The	  process	  brought	  to	  the	  fore	  a	  major	  policy/strategy	  weakness	  however.	  The	  drivers	  of	  the	  C&T	  value	  chain	  –	  the	  seven	  major	  clothing	  retail	  chain	  stores	  who	  controlled	  70%	  of	  domestic	  sales	  -­‐	  were	  only	  weakly	  represented	  in	  the	  CSP	  process.	  This	  was	  a	  crucial	  flaw	  since	  the	  entire	  orientation	  of	  the	  industry	  had	  shifted	  toward	  the	  domestic	  market.	  In	  order	  to	  rectify	  this	  each	  of	  the	  major	  retailers	  were	  therefore	  visited	  by	  Barnes	  and	  their	   buy	   in	   to	   the	   process	  was	   secured.	   They	   agreed	   to	   co-­‐fund	   a	  major	  workshop	   to	  discuss	  a	  coherent	  approach	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  entire	  C&T	  value	  chain.	  By	   October	   2005	   a	   major	   workshop	   for	   the	   entire	   industry	   –	   retailers,	   clothing	  manufacturers	  and	  textile	  mills	  -­‐	  was	  held.	  This	  Imbizo	  –	  a	  Zulu	  name	  for	  a	  major	  coming	  together	   of	   parties	   to	   thrash	   out	   differences	   –	   was	   hosted	   by	   the	   Cape	   Clothing	   and	  Textile	   Cluster11.	   It	   had	   the	   explicit	   aim	   to	   develop	   value	   chain	   alignment	   between	   the	  various	   links	   in	   the	   chain.	   Only	   issues	   of	   value	   chain	   alignment	   were	   allowed	   in	   the	  discussion.	   In	  other	  words	  whingeing	  about	   labour	   issues	  or	   lobbying	   for	  state	  support	  was	  banned	  from	  the	  discussion	  and	  participants	  were	  forced	  to	  focus	  on	  blockages	  and	  opportunities	  for	  systemic	  competitiveness	  and	  cooperation	  along	  the	  value	  chain.	  	  Apart	  from	   the	   stimulus	   of	   the	   CSP,	   the	   key	   issue	   driving	   the	   discussion	   was	   a	   crisis	   in	   the	  industry	  occasioned	  by	  a	  major	  increase	  in	  Chinese	  clothing	  and	  fabric	  imports,	  and	  the	  possibility	   of	   creating	   cooperation	   along	   the	   value	   chain	   to	   take	   advantage	   of	   local	  production.	  This	  required	  a	  compact	  along	  the	  chain	  to	  produce	  the	  speed	  and	  flexibility	  in	   production	   that	   the	   retailers	   required	   and	   which	   would	   result	   in	   a	   competitive	  advantage	  over	  Chinese.	  	  	  At	  the	  end	  of	  two	  days	  the	  retailers,	  clothing	  manufacturers	  and	  textile	  mills	  committed	  themselves	  to	  a	  strategic	  vision	  for	  the	  industry	  and	  initial	  steps	  to	   implement	  it.	  A	  few	  months	   later	   all	   the	   major	   retailers	   joined	   the	   Cape	   and	   KZN	   Clothing	   and	   Textile	  Clusters,	   paying	   not	   only	   special	   membership	   fees	   but	   also	   creating	   a	   new	   fund	   for	  achieving	   alignment	   in	   the	   supply	   chain	   and	   upgrading	   the	   C&T	   manufacturers.	  Subsequent	  Imbizos	  began	  to	  put	  flesh	  on	  the	  value	  chain	  alignment	  skeleton,	  with	  major	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  This	  Imbizo,	  and	  subsequent	  ones,	  was	  chaired	  by	  myself,	  with	  Barnes	  providing	  key	  strategic	  inputs.	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strategic	   and	   operational	   interventions	   planned	   and	   implemented	   to	   achieve	   systemic	  competitiveness.	  Seemingly	  a	  new	  era	  was	  born.	  	  Out	  of	  this	  was	  also	  born	  a	  new	  private	  sector	  driven	  loose	  organisational	  framework	  for	  the	   industry,	  encompassing	  the	  three	  sectoral	  associations	   in	   the	  value	  chain	  –	   the	  C&T	  
Business	  Alliance	  -­‐	  with	  an	  explicit	  mandate	  to	  coordinate	  policy	  cooperation,	  and	  present	  a	   coherent	   policy/strategic	   front	   in	   dealings	   with	   government.	   I	   was	   appointed	   the	  convenor	  and	  chief	  negotiator	  of	  the	  Business	  Alliance.	  From	   the	   perspective	   of	   industrial	   policy	   these	   events	   and	   organisation	   consequences	  were	  a	  remarkable	  achievement.	  Two	  parallel	  policy	  processes	  –	  one	  state	  driven	  and	  one	  private	   sector	   driven	   -­‐	   were	   seemingly	   coming	   together	   to	   produce	   a	   significantly	  powerful	  and	  coherent	   industrial	  policy/strategy	   for	   the	  C&T	  sector.	  This	  encompassed	  all	   the	   major	   components	   required	   -­‐	   direct	   and	   indirect	   policy,	   policy	   design,	  macro/meso/micro	  aspects,	  and	  also	  critically,	  an	  appropriate	  institutional	  framework	  at	  the	  national	  and	  local	  levels.	  	  
Politics	  trumps	  industry	  cooperation	  and	  value	  chain	  alignment	  It	  seemed	  that	  a	  new	  era	  was	  inaugurated.	  However,	  instead	  of	  receiving	  major	  political	  backing	  and	  accolades,	  this	  process	  came	  under	  huge	  political	  pressure	  and	  was	  derailed	  in	  the	  end	  through	  the	  impact	  of	  political	  conflicts	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  policy	  will.	  	  Firstly,	   the	  trade	  union,	  which	  had	  been	  given	  all	   the	  opportunities	   for	  engagement	  but	  had	   steadfastly	   refused	   to	   participate	   in	   the	   process	   of	   drawing	   up	   the	   CSP,	   used	   its	  membership	  of	   the	  Congress	  Alliance	  (ANC,	  SACP	  and	  COSATU)	   to	   initiate	  a	  behind	   the	  scenes	   lobbying	   process.	   The	   formal	   signing	   off	   of	   the	   C&T	   CSP	   by	   the	   DTI	   somehow	  never	  occurred,	  and	   to	   the	  surprise	  of	   the	  entire	  C&T	  value	  chain,	   in	   late	  2005	   the	  DTI	  suddenly	   re-­‐opened	  discussions	  around	   the	  CSP.	   Industry	  went	   to	   these	  meetings,	  now	  represented	  by	  the	  Business	  Alliance	  of	  the	  C&T	  sector,	  and	  presented	  coherent	  and	  more	  sophisticated	   industrial	   policy	   positions.	   The	   union	   demanded	   a	   clause-­‐by-­‐clause	   re-­‐negotiation	   of	   the	   entire	   CSP,	   presenting	   positions	   which	   were	   not	   only	   utterly	  unacceptable	   to	   the	   Business	   Alliance,	   but	   also	   threatened	   the	   policy	   and	   institutional	  coherence	   of	   the	   CSP.	   In	   effect	   they	  were	   designed	   to	   allow	   the	   union	   to	   be	   the	   prime	  driver	   of	   industrial	   policy.	   The	   DTI	   dithered,	   reverted	   to	   commandist	   policy	   positions,	  tried	   to	  bully	   the	  Business	  Alliance,	  and	  attempted	   to	  steamroll	   through	  changes	   to	   the	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CSP	   in	   order	   to	   satisfy	   the	   ANC’s	   alliance	   partner.	   It	   appeared	   that	   the	   object	   of	   the	  exercise	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  union	  and	  the	  DTI	  was	  to	  break	  the	  newly	  achieved	  alliance	  welding	  together	  the	  industry	  along	  the	  value	  chain,	  and	  the	  primary	  target	  they	  aimed	   at	   were	   the	   retailers.	   This	   was	   ironic	   since	   even	   a	   cursory	   knowledge	   of	   the	  dynamics	   of	   the	   industry	   would	   have	   told	   them	   that	   retail	   drove	   the	   value	   chain	   and	  without	  their	  cooperation	  no	  coherent	  and	  sustainable	  industrial	  policy	  was	  possible.	  Meeting	   followed	   meeting,	   and	   eventually,	   by	   mid	   2006,	   an	   incoherent	   document	  containing	   a	   variety	   of	   compromises	   which	   the	   Business	   Alliance,	   disillusioned	   by	   the	  process,	   said	   they	   could	   live	  with	  but	  were	   less	   than	  enthusiastic	   about,	   emerged	   from	  the	  process.	  However,	   to	  all	   intents	  and	  purposes,	  many	  of	   the	  key	   the	  members	  of	   the	  Business	  Alliance	  had	  by	  this	  stage	  abandoned	  the	  CSP	  ship.	  Their	  attitude	  at	  this	  stage	  was	   that	   the	  CSP	  was	  a	  government	  document	  and	   there	  was	  no	  compunction	  on	   their	  part	  to	  sign	  it.	  The	  retailers,	  who	  were	  absolutely	  key	  to	  achieving	  any	  coherent	  strategic	  interventions,	   especially	   in	   respect	   of	   value	   chain	   alignment,	   withdrew	   from	   any	  institutional	   involvement	   in	   this	   government	   led	   process.	   The	   textile	   and	   clothing	  development	   council	   –	   now	   renamed	  with	   a	   politically	   correct	   appellation	   –	  would	  not	  see	   the	   light	  of	  day	   in	  any	   form	  acceptable	   to	   industry.	  The	  DTI	  and	  the	  union	   felt	   they	  had	  asserted	  their	  political	  authority,	  but	  they	  did	  so	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  massive	  policy	  gains	  that	  had	  been	  made	  previously	  and	  the	  destruction	  of	  any	  trust	  that	  had	  been	  built	  up	  between	  the	  industry	  and	  the	  government.	  The	  CSP	  was	  named	  and	  christened,	  but	  in	  actual	  fact	  the	  industrial	  policy	  for	  the	  sector	  was	  stillborn.	  What	  about	  the	  other	  C&T	  industrial	  policy	  initiative?	  The	  private	  sector	  driven12	  process	  of	   value	   chain	   alignment	   driven	   by	   the	   clothing	   and	   textile	   clusters	  which	   had	  made	   a	  quantum	   leap	   in	   securing	   major	   buy	   in	   from	   the	   retailers	   and	   developing	   operational	  programmes.	   This	   was	   still	   a	   major	   industrial	   policy/strategy	   achievement	   based	   on	  building	  trust	  and	  cooperation	  along	  the	  value	  chain,	  albeit	  operating	  outside	  of,	  and	   in	  spite	   of,	   national	   government	   activities.	   Unfortunately	   government	   conspired	   to	  significantly	  undermine,	  but	  not	  destroy,	  this	  industrial	  policy	  initiative	  also.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Although	  the	  initiative	  was	  driven	  by	  the	  SPV	  clothing	  clusters	  the	  industrial	  policy	  was	  to	  all	  intents	  and	  purposes	  so	  dependent	  on	  the	  private	  sector	  involvement	  that	  it	  was	  effectively	  ‘private	  sector	  driven’.	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South	  African	  C&T	  manufacturers	  were	  struggling	  to	  compete	  with	  Chinese	  imports.	  This	  was	  impacting	  on	  local	  production	  and	  employment,	  and	  both	  the	  manufacturers	  and	  the	  union	  were	   extremely	   concerned	   about	   the	   consequences.	   	   Despite	   pleas	   from	   around	  2004	   to	   government	   for	   some	   form	  of	   protective	   action	   at	   the	   expiry	   of	   the	  Multifibre	  Agreement	  (MFA)	  on	  Dec	  31	  2004,	  their	  voices	  fell	  on	  deaf	  ears.	  By	  late	  2006	  the	  clothing	  manufacturers	  had	  realised	  that	  their	  major	  hope	  lay	  in	  an	  alliance	  with	  the	  retailers	  to	  achieve	   value	   chain	   alignment	   in	   order	   to	   raise	   their	   competitiveness	   and	   capabilities	  rather	  than	  seeking	  tariff	  or	  quota	  protection	  against	   legal	   imports.13	  A	  month	  after	  the	  CSP	  discussions	  were	  concluded,	   in	   late	  August	  2006,	   the	  DTI	  announced	  that	   they	  had	  agreed	  to	  a	  two	  year	  voluntary	  restraint	  agreement	  with	  China	  imposing	  clothing	  import	  quotas	  on	  selected	  items.	  They	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  this	  was	  a	  strategic	  intervention	  aimed	  at	  the	  retailers	  and	  supposedly	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  clothing	  and	  textile	  manufacturers	  and	  workers	  and	  would	  take	  effect	  in	  October	  2006.	  The	  union	  was	  named	  as	  the	  primary	  proposer	  of	  the	  initiative	  with	  support	  from	  the	  clothing	  manufacturers.	  The	   industry	  was	   shocked	   and	   in	   an	   uproar.	   The	   retailers	   denounced	   the	  measures	   as	  causing	  sales	  chaos	  and	  likely	  to	  be	  ineffectual	  in	  assisting	  the	  clothing	  manufacturers	  to	  become	  more	   competitive.	   It	   was	   pointed	   out	   that	   the	   result	   would	   simply	   be	   import	  diversion.	  The	  retailers	  now	  also	  looked	  with	  some	  suspicion	  at	  the	  clothing	  and	  textile	  manufacturers	  with	  whom	   they	  were	   discussing	   initiatives	   to	   deepen	   cooperation	   and	  achieve	  value	  chain	  alignment.	  	  For	  their	  part	  the	  clothing	  manufacturers	  denounced	  the	  whole	  Chinese	  quota	  initiative	  as	  coming	  too	  late	  to	  be	  useful.	  Furthermore	  they	  said	  they	  had	   not	   been	   consulted	   by	   government,	   and	   did	   not	   feel	   the	   quotas	   were	   in	   their	  interests.	  Indeed,	  mindful	  of	  the	  suspicious	  eye	  of	  the	  retailers,	  they	  distanced	  themselves	  publicly	  from	  the	  entire	  initiative.	  The	  textile	  association	  sat	  on	  the	  fence	  but	  it	  was	  clear	  to	  all	  concerned	  that	  they	  were	  willing	  to	  provide	  covert	  backing	  to	  the	  initiative,	  even	  if	  they	  were	  reluctant	  to	  say	  so	  publicly.	  	  In	   the	   end	   the	   imposition	   of	   quotas	   was	   delayed	   until	   Jan	   2007.	   The	   process	   of	  enforcement	  was	  chaotic	  in	  many	  respects	  and	  a	  special	  committee	  was	  set	  up	  by	  the	  DTI	  to	   administer	   it	   including	   obvious	   mistakes	   and	   application	   for	   exemption.	   This	  committee	  was	  supposedly	  broadly	  based	  but	  real	  power	  resided	  in	  the	  union,	  which	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Illegal	  imports	  was	  a	  major	  problem	  but	  all	  major	  players	  in	  the	  industry	  agreed	  on	  the	  need	  for	  action	  to	  be	  taken	  in	  this	  regard.	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DTI	   claimed	   had	   been	   the	   proposer	   and	   hence	   had	   the	   final	   say	   in	   signing	   off	   on	   any	  amendment	   etc.	   The	   result	   was	   a	   fairly	   shameless	   abuse	   of	   power	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	  union,	  and	  a	  number	  of	  covert	  horse-­‐trading	  deals	  took	  place	  behind	  the	  scenes.	  Suffice	  to	  say	  that	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  two	  year	  period	  none	  of	  the	  stated	  aims	  of	  the	  quota	  initiative	  were	  achieved.	  The	  industry	  carried	  on	  bleeding,	  firm	  competitiveness	  did	  not	  increase,	  major	   investment	   did	   not	   take	   place,	   and	   import	   diversion	   from	   other	   Asian	   suppliers	  was	   the	  order	   of	   the	  day.	   Indeed	  one	   could	   argue	   that	   the	   initiative	   simply	   alerted	   the	  retailers	  to	  other	  sources	  of	  supply	  which	  they	  could	  take	  advantage	  of	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  quota	  restrictions.	  	  However	  the	  major	  consequence	  of	  this	  ill	   intentioned	  industrial	  policy	  initiative	  not	  its	  immediate	  impact	  in	  respect	  of	  quotas,	  but	  rather	  the	  destructive	  impact	  of	  undermining	  the	  foundations	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  driven	  industrial	  policy.	  It	  palpably	  eroded	  the	  hard	  earned	  trust	  that	  had	  been	  built	  up	  between	  the	  various	  players	  in	  the	  C&T	  value	  chain.	  	  The	  massive	   enthusiasm	  displayed	   at	   the	   early	   Imbizos	   gradually	   dissipated.	   The	   value	  chain	  alignment	  process	  has	  continued	  but	  in	  a	  more	  restricted	  fashion.	  The	  clothing	  and	  textile	  clusters	  still	  operate	  successfully	  but	  retail	  involvement	  is	  less	  engaged	  and	  more	  perfunctory.	   In	   short	   a	   significant	   industrial	   policy/strategy	   opportunity	   has	   been	  dissipated.	  	  
CONCLUSION	  Building	   industrial	   policy	   capability	   and	   strategic	   capacity	   involves	   setting	   into	   play	   a	  mutually	  reinforcing	  relationship	  between	  a	  number	  of	  key	  institutional	  processes.	  These	  involve	  direct	  and	   indirect	  strategic	   initiatives,	   revolve	  around	  getting	   the	  macro,	  meso	  and	   micro	   levels	   of	   intervention	   in	   place,	   and	   making	   sure	   that	   the	   policy	   design	   is	  inclusive.	  It	  requires	  recognising	  that	  without	  industry	  involvement	  and	  buy-­‐in	  success	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  evasive.	  	  However,	  the	  key	  conclusion	  from	  this	  discussion	  note	  is	  that	  this	  is	  not	  simply	  an	  issue	  of	   policy	   formulation.	   At	   its	   heart	   it	   is	   also	   one	   of	   ensuring	   sufficient	   political	   will	   is	  present	  to	  overcome	  obstacles,	  resist	  countervailing	  pressures	  from	  groupings	  pursuing	  only	   sectarian	   ends,	   and	   maintaining	   the	   integrity	   of	   the	   institutional	   form	   to	   build	  sustainable	   public-­‐private	   partnerships.	   This	   is	   very	   hard	   to	   do,	   much	   harder	   than	  formulating	  an	  industrial	  policy	  on	  paper.	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